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NOTES
ARBITRATION-Arbitrator Potentially Liable for Failure
to Render a Decision. Baar v. Tigerman, 140 Cal. App. 3d
979, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1983).
The process of settling private disputes through arbitra-
tion' has long been favored as a quick and certain alterna-
tive to litigation and overcrowded court dockets.2 To further
this process, arbitrators have historically been granted quasi-
judicial immunity in order to assure the exercise of their free
and independent judgment. A grant of immunity also
serves to encourage individuals to become arbitrators.4 Re-
cently, however, in Baar v. T'german5 the California Court
1. Broadly speaking, arbitration is a contractual proceeding, whereby the par-
ties to any controversy or dispute, in order to obtain an inexpensive and
speedy final disposition of the matter involved, select judges of their own
choice and by consent submit their controversy to such judges for determina-
tion, in the place of the tribunals provided by the ordinary processes of law.
M. DOMKE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1.01, at I
(1968) (quoting Gates v. Arizona Brewing Co., 54 Ariz. 266, 269, 95 P.2d 49, 50
(1939)). See generally F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS (3d
ed. 1973); 0. FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION (2d
ed. 1983); G. GOLDBERG, A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1983).
2. Baar v. Tigerman, 140 Cal. App. 3d 979, 984, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834, 838 (1983)
("the courts have looked favorably upon arbitration as an alternative to litigation in
the courts"). See also Saxis Steamship Co. v. Multifacs Int'l Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d
577, 582 (2d Cir. 1967) (arbitration provides for the speedy disposition of disputes
without the expense and delay of extended court proceedings); Rhine v. Union Car-
bide Corp., 343 F.2d 12, 16 (6th Cir. 1965) ("[u]nder federal law it is now a clearly
established national policy to encourage the use of arbitration"); M. DOMKE, supra
note 1; Burger, Isn't There .4 Better Way, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982).
3. See, e.g., Cahn v. International Ladies' Garment Union, 311 F.2d 113 (3d Cir.
1962) (per curiam); Hill v. Aro Corp., 263 F. Supp. 324 (N.D. Ohio 1967); Bever v.
Brown, 56 Iowa 565, 9 N.W. 911 (1881); Hoosac Tunnel Dock & Elevator Co. v.
O'Brien, 137 Mass. 424 (1884). See also M. DOMKE, supra note 1, § 23.01; F.
ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 1, at 95; 0. FAIRWEATHER, supra note 1, at 96;
Domke, The Arbitrator's Immunity from Liability: A Comparative Survey, 1971 U.
TOL. L. REV. 99.
4. See, e.g., Tamari v. Conrad, 552 F.2d 778, 781 (7th Cir. 1977) ("individuals
... cannot be expected to volunteer to arbitrate disputes if they can be caught up in
the struggle between the litigants and saddled with the burdens of defending a
lawsuit").
5. 140 Cal. App. 3d 979, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1983).
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of Appeal held that an arbitrator could be held liable for
damages for failure to render a timely decision. Rather than
extending quasi-judicial immunity to protect Tigerman, a
private arbitrator who failed to render a timely award, the
court examined the nature of arbitration and quasi-judicial
immunity and concluded that Tigerman could be held liable
for compensatory and punitive damages for breach of con-
tract and for several other possible causes of action.6
This decision has not only been a cause of great concern
for those in the field of arbitration, 7 but it also raises ques-
tions which touch on the very essence of arbitration, and on
the concept of judicial immunity. The resolution of the is-
sues in Baar is made particularly difficult by the presence of
two equally compelling, but diametrically opposed policies.
Holding an arbitrator liable for failure to render a timely
award furthers the policy favoring arbitration as a means for
the speedy resolution of private disputes.8 Consequently, a
grant of immunity for such conduct would run directly con-
trary to this policy.9 However, holding arbitrators liable for
failing to make a timely decision could also have a "chilling
effect" on arbitration - fewer individuals would be willing
to offer their services as arbitrators, lest they be required to
answer in court for damages.' 0 As a result, the policy of en-
couraging arbitration as an alternative to litigation would be
hindered." In addition, parties involved in arbitration
might be less willing to grant extensions to arbitrators,
knowing that they could recoup not only the arbitrator's
fees, but costs and attorney fees as well. Thus, rather than
using arbitration as a means for avoiding the courts, the par-
ties would again find themselves on the courthouse steps.
Finally, the quality of the arbitrator's decision could be af-
6. Id. at 986, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 834. See also infra note 16 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Petition For Hearing In The Supreme Court After Decision By The
District Court Of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, And Denial Of
Petition For Re-Hearing Therein at 5-7, Baar v. Tigerman, 2nd Civil Nos. 64463,
65501 and 65888 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Petition of the AAA].
8. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
9. Baar, 140 Cal. App. 3d at 985, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
10. See, e.g., Tamari v. Conrad, 552 F.2d at 778, 781 (7th Cir. 1977); Petition of
the AAA, supra note 7, at 6.
I I. See generally Burger, supra note 2.
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fected, 12 the arbitrator being more concerned with getting his
decision out on time than with making the "right" decision.
This would be especially true in cases in which difficult and
complex issues are involved. All of these policies act in
favor of granting an arbitrator immunity, at least to some
extent, for failure to render a timely decision, thus setting the
stage for a confrontation between two equally laudable,
though opposing, policy considerations.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1975, pursuant to the terms of their limited partner-
ship agreement, plaintiffs Baar and others engaged the
American Arbitration Association (AAA) to administer arbi-
tration proceedings. 13 The AAA selected Tigerman as the
arbitrator and hearings commenced on November 1, 1976.
Over a period of more than three years, approximately forty-
three days of evidentiary hearings ensued, finally concluding
on March 11, 1980. The parties submitted final briefs on
July 17, 1980 and Tigerman was given thirty days to render
his decision.14  Tigerman was later granted a three month
extension, but still had not made an award seven months af-
ter the arbitration was submitted. The parties then filed a
written objection and Tigerman lost his authority to make
the award. 15
12. Boar, 140 Cal. App. 3d at 985, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
13. Baar v. Tigerman, 140 Cal. App. 3d 979, 981, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834, 835-36
(1983).
14. Id. at 981, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 836. See id. at 981 n.3, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 836 n.3
(citing Commercial Arbitration Rules). The Commercial Arbitration Rules provide
in part: "The award shall be made promptly by the Arbitrator and, unless otherwise
agreed by the parties, or specified by law, no later than thirty days from the date of
closing the hearings .... ." Commercial Arbitration Rules § 41 (Am. Arb. Ass'n
1982), reprinted in G. GOLDBERG, supra note 1, at 119. See also Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
§ 1283.8 (West 1982); Code of Professional Responsibility for Arbitrators of Labor-
Management Disputes § J.3. (1974); Uniform Arbitration Act § 8(b), 7 U.L.A. 1
(1956); M. DOMKE, supra note 1, § 29.01; 0. FAIRWEATHER, supra note 1, at 569-70,
621-23; G. GOLDBERG, supra note 1, at 57.
15. Baar, 140 Cal. App. 3d at 981-82, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 836. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
§ 1283.8 (West 1982) provides:
The award shall be made within the time fixed therefor by the agreement or, if
not so fixed, within such time as the court orders on petition of a party to the
arbitration. The parties to the arbitration may extend the time either before or
after the expiration thereof. A party to the arbitration waives the objection that
an award was not made within the time required unless he gives the arbitrators
19831
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Subsequently, Baar and the others instituted civil actions
against Tigerman and the AAA, alleging breach of contract,
negligence, unjust enrichment and various other causes of
action.16  The plaintiffs sought $148,000 in compensatory
damages and $1,000,000 in punitive damages.' 7 The trial
court sustained the defendants' demurrers and held that
Tigerman and the AAA were protected by arbitral immu-
nity.' The California Court of Appeal reversed, refusing to
shield Tigerman with quasi-judicial immunity for breaching
his contract to render a timely decision,' 9 and held the AAA
potentially liable for its administrative actions.2
II. THE DOCTRINE OF QUASI-JUDICIAL IMMUNITY AS IT
RELATES TO ARBITRATION
The concept of judicial immunity, from which quasi-ju-
dicial immunity evolved, has been in existence for centuries
and is "deeply rooted" in the common law. It first became
written notice o/his objection prior to the service of a signed copy ofthe award on
him.
(emphasis added.)
16. Baar, 140 Cal. App. 3d at 982 n.5, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 836 n.5. Additional
causes of action included: breach of fiduciary duty, breach of implied covenant of
good faith, detrimental reliance, injurious falsehood and violations of constitutional
rights. Id.
17. Brief for Respondent at 3, Baar v. Tigerman, 140 Cal. App. 3d 979, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 834 (1983).
18. See Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Appellant at 2, Baar v. Tigerman, 140
Cal. App. 3d 979, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1983) (citing the holding of the superior court:
"Defendants have immunity, whether award was late or, as here, where award was
not issued.").
19. Baar, 140 Cal. App. 3d at 981, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
20. Id. The immunity of the sponsoring organization, the AAA, will not be ad-
dressed in this note because any reasoning which would apply in holding the arbitra-
tor immune or liable would also apply to the sponsoring organization. In Corey v.
New York Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205 (6th Cir. 1982) the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held:
Extension of arbitral immunity to encompass boards which sponsor arbitration
is a natural and necessary product of the policies underlying arbitral immu-
nity; otherwise the immunity extended to arbitrators is illusionary. It would be
of little value to the whole arbitral procedure to merely shift the liability to the
sponsoring association.
Id. at 1211 (cited with approval in Baar v. Tigerman, 140 Cal. App. 3d 979, 986, 189
Cal. Rptr. 834, 839 (1983)). See also Rubenstein v. Otterbourg, 78 Misc. 2d 376, 357
N.Y.S.2d 62 (1973).
21. Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282, 291 (N.Y. 1810); Floyd & Barker, 12 Coke 25
(1608).
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established in the United States in Bradley v. Fisher2 in
which the Supreme Court held that immunity was necessary
to secure the independence required for principled and fear-
less decision making. It has since been extended from judges
to various other public officials2 3 and professionals24 in the
form of "quasi-judicial" immunity. The primary impetus
behind the decision to grant immunity to certain individuals
is the belief that immunity is necessary to protect them from
suits filed by "disgruntled litigants who [seek] to hold them
liable for alleged misconduct in arriving at a decision. "25 As
the Court stated in Bradley, "[w]hen the controversy in-
volves questions affecting large amounts of property or re-
lates to a matter of general public concern . . . the
disappointment occasioned by an adverse decision, often
finds vent in imputations of [improper motives], and from
the imperfection of human nature this is hardly a subject of
wonder." 26
22. 80 U.s. (13 Wall.) 335, 357 (1872).
23. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (quasi-judicial immunity
granted to federal hearing examiners or administrative law judges); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (state prosecutor immune from action); Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (legislators entitled to absolute immunity); Yaselli v.
Goff, 275 U.S. 503 (1927), af'g 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926) (federal prosecutors enti-
tled to quasi-judicial immunity). See generally Cass, Damage Suits Against Public
Officers, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1110 (1981); McCormick & Kirkpatrick, Immunities Of
State Officials Under Section 1983, 8 RUT.-CAM. L. Rnv. 65 (1976).
24. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (school administrators enti-
tled to qualified immunity); Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1962) (ar-
chitect acting as a "quasi-arbitrator" entitled to quasi-judicial immunity); Wilder v.
Crook, 250 Ala. 424, 34 So. 2d 832 (1948) (engineer acting as an arbitrator immune
from suit for damages); Hoosac Tunnel Dock & Elevator Co. v. O'Brien, 137 Mass.
424 (1884) (arbitrator entitled to quasi-judicial immunity). See generally Little, The
Architect's Immunity As Arbiter, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 339 (1979); Marshall, Arbitral
Immunity, 1976 J. Bus. L. 313.
25. Baar v. Tigerman, 140 Cal. App. 3d 979, 983, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834, 837 (1983)
(emphasis omitted).
26. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 348. For a humorous example of a case arising out of
the "imperfection of human nature," see Hohensee v. Goon Squad, 171 F. Supp. 562
(M.D. Pa. 1959), in which inmates of a penitentiary brought a ten million dollarpro
se antitrust suit against various defendants, including certain prison officials, guards,
and the judge who sentenced one of the inmates. The complaint was dismissed and
the defendants held immune, their actions being "so closely associated with the judi-
cial process as to make necessary [their] protection from harassment in order to pro-
tect the judicial process." Id. at 569 (quoting Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F.2d 135, 141
(D.C. Cir. 1938)). See also Calzarano v. Liebowitz, 550 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (one million dollarpro se action brought against an arbitrator who upheld the
1983]
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Although it is not quite as deeply rooted in the common
law as judicial immunity, the application of "quasi-judicial"
immunity to arbitrators (arbitral immunity) 7 is nonetheless
well established.28 An oft-quoted phrase describing this im-
munity was set forth in 1884 by the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court in Hoosac Tunnel Dock & Elevator Co. v.
O'Brien :29
An arbitrator is a quasi judicial officer . . . exercising
judicial functions. There is as much reason in his case for
protecting and insuring his impartiality, independence, and
freedom from undue influences, as in the case of a judge or
juror. The same considerations of public policy apply, and
we are of the opinion that the same immunity extends to
him.3 0
In the overwhelming majority of cases involving arbitral
immunity, the decision-making conduct of the arbitrator is
challenged and the shield of quasi-judicial immunity serves
to protect him from allegations of fraud or corruption in
making his decision.3 1 The cases involving arbitral immu-
nity read like mirror images of each other. In each case, the
plaintifis discharge; the complaint, alleging that the arbitrator's conduct violated the
eighth amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment, was
dismissed).
27. See, e.g., Jones v. Brown, 54 Iowa 747, 6 N.W. 140 (1880). In Jones, an arbi-
trator attempting to recover his ten dollar per day fee was confronted with a counter-
claim seeking to hold him liable for fraud and corruption. The Iowa Supreme Court
held that arbitrators "are in a certain sense a court" and are therefore clothed with the
same immunity as the judiciary. Id. at _, 6 N.W. at 142. See Domke, supra note 3,
for discussion of the doctrine of arbitral immunity in various countries.
28. See, e.g., UAW v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 701 F.2d 1181 (6th Cir. 1983); Co-
rey v. New York Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205 (6th Cir. 1982); Tamari v. Conrad, 552
F.2d 778 (7th Cir. 1977); Cahn v. International Ladies' Garment Union, 311 F.2d 113
(3d Cir. 1962) (per curiam); Yates v. Yellow Freight Sys., 501 F. Supp. 101 (S.D. Ohio
1980); Hill v. Aro Corp., 263 F. Supp. 324 (N.D. Ohio 1967); Bever v. Brown, 56 Iowa
565, 9 N.W. 911 (1881); Hoosac Tunnel Dock & Elevator Co. v. O'Brien, 134 Mass.
424 (1884); Babylon Milk & Cream Co. v. Horvitz, 151 N.Y.S.2d 221 (Sup. Ct. 1956),
aff'd, 4 A.D.2d 777, 165 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1957); Rubenstein v. Otterbourg, 78 Misc. 2d
376, 357 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1973).
29. 134 Mass. 424 (1884).
30. Id. at 426.
31. See, e.g., Cahn v. International Ladies' Garment Union, 311 F.2d 113 (3d
Cir. 1962) (per curiam); Hoosac Tunnel Dock & Elevator Co. v. O'Brien, 134 Mass.
424 (1884); Babylon Milk & Cream Co. v. Horvitz, 151 N.Y.S.2d 221 (Sup. Ct. 1956),
aff'd, 4 A.D.2d 777, 165 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1957). One unique case is Tamari v. Conrad,
552 F.2d 778 (7th Cir. 1977), in which the court of appeals held arbitrators immune
from suits questioning their authority to make a ruling in a case.
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party losing in arbitration has charged that the arbitrator
colluded with the other side in order to defraud him.32 As a
result, any party who believes that such misconduct has oc-
curred can petition to have the arbitrator's award vacated.33
However, except in a few limited circumstances, the arbitra-
tor's decision will stand.34 Thus, while it is clear that an ar-
bitrator is immune from actions challenging his conduct or
motives in making an award, it remains unclear whether the
blanket of immunity protects him in the performance of
other acts taken in his capacity as an arbitrator .3  The cases
on this point are far fewer in number.
32. For an illustrative case see Babylon Milk & Cream Co. v. Horvitz, 151
N.Y.S.2d 221 (Sup. Ct. 1956), affid, 4 A.D.2d 777, 165 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1957), the first
case in which arbitral immunity was granted to a labor arbitrator.
33. See, for example, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1285 (West 1982) which provides
that: "Any party to an arbitration in which an award has been made may petition the
court to confirm, correct or vacate the award. The petition shall name as respondents
all parties to the arbitration and may name as respondents any other persons bound
by the arbitration award." Accord, WIs. STAT. § 788.09 (1981-82).
34. See, for example, United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1976) which
provides that a district court:
[M]ay make an order vacating an arbitration award upon the application of
any party to the arbitration -
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent
and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the
rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submit-
ted was not made.
(e) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement re-
quired the award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion,
direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
Accord Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1286.2 (West 1982); Wis. STAT § 788.10 (1981-82). See
also Aerojet-General Corp. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 478 F.2d 248, 252 (9th
Cir. 1973) (an arbitration award must be upheld unless it is shown that there was
partiality on the part of the arbitrator, that the arbitrator exceeded his or her author-
ity, or that the award was rendered in manifest disregard of the law).
35. See Domke, supra note 3, at 103:
The arbitrator who does not fulfill at all or not in due time the obligations
which he had undertaken by acceptance of his appointment, is liable to the
parties for all damages caused by his unlawful refusal or delay, irrespective of
their right to request the termination of the arbitration proceedings.
1983]
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In E. C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Construction Co. ,36 the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held an architect act-
ing in the position of an arbitrator liable for failure to render
his decision on time.37 However, as the court in Baar v.
Tigerman 38 noted, Ernst is distinguishable on its facts and is
therefore of little precedential value.39
No case has ever directly addressed the issue of an arbi-
trator's quasi-judicial immunity for failure to render a
timely decision. Other than Ernst,4° in which the court de-
clined to extend immunity, the only case involving this issue
is Graphic Arts International Union, Local 508 v. Standard
Register Co. 4 1In Standard Register an arbitrator failed to
render an award more than six years after the submission of
the dispute to arbitration. 42 The District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio enjoined the arbitrator from col-
lecting any fee for his services and submitted the question of
compensatory and punitive damages to arbitration.43 How-
ever, the concept of arbitral immunity was never mentioned.
36. 551 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied in part, 559 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1067 (1978).
37. 551 F.2d at 1033.
38. 140 Cal. App. 3d 979, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1983).
39. The architect's liability was more closely related to negligence in the perform-
ance of his duties as an architect. Id. at 983 n.6, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 837 n.6. See infra
note 58.
40. See infra note 58.
41. 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2212, rehk' granted, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2214 (S.D.
Ohio 1979). However, the judgment and order of the district court were later set aside
as being beyond the matters presented to the court. Graphic Arts Int'l Union, Local
508 v. Standard Register Co., 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2214 (S.D. Ohio 1979). In its
original decision the court removed the arbitrator and enjoined him from collecting
any fee for services rendered. However, only motions to dismiss the complaint were
pending before the court. Therefore, the court's order enjoining the arbitrator from
recovering his fees went beyond the matters presented before it. As a result, the origi-
nal order and judgment were set aside. The court in its second decision did, however,
deny the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant. Id. at 2215. Therefore, the court's
original reasoning pertaining to the arbitrator's potential liability would still be valid.
42. Standard Register, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2212.
43. Id. at 2214. The seemingly ludicrous result of submitting the question of an
arbitrator's liability for compensatory and punitive damages to another arbitrator
stems from the fact that the case involved a labor arbitration, in which somewhat
different legal principles apply. Since the question of damages grew out of the terms
of a collective bargaining agreement, the court, following the admonition of the
Supreme Court in United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960),
submitted it to arbitration.
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Because there are few cases on point regarding this issue,
it is necessary to further examine the doctrine of quasi-judi-
cial immunity and to determine what factors courts consider
in making a decision to blanket an individual with quasi-
judicial immunity.
Any discussion concerning the scope of immunity must
necessarily begin with Butz v. Economou.44 In Butz the
Supreme Court stated that the proper test to apply in deter-
mining whether absolute immunity extends to any person is
the "functional comparability" of his judgment to that of a
judge.45 In other words, an individual will be granted abso-
lute immunity if "quasi-judicial" functions are performed by
that individual.46 Regarding the scope of immunity and the
determination of whether certain officials in the executive
branch enjoyed quasi-judicial immunity, the Supreme Court
stated that "[t]he cluster of immunities protecting the various
participants in judge-supervised trials stems from the char-
acteristics of the judicial process rather than its location." 47
A grant of immunity, therefore, depends not on the source of
the decision making power in question, but rather on the na-
ture of that power.48
Further guidelines for determining the scope of quasi-ju-
dicial immunity can be found in Stump v. Sparkman .49 In
Sparkman, the Supreme Court faced a situation in which a
judge had wrongfully approved a petition for the steriliza-
tion of a minor. The Court granted the judge immunity,
stating that a judge will be subject to liability only when he
acts in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction." 50 Further, a
judge is only absolutely immune from liability for acts per-
44. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
45. Id. at 512 (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n.20 (1976)).
46. UAW v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 701 F.2d 1181, 1185 (6th Cir. 1983).
47. Butz, 438 U.S. at 512.
48. Corey v. New York Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205, 1211 (6th Cir. 1982).
49. 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
50. Id. at 357. For acts taken in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction" see Greg-
ory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1974) (judge held liable for damages suffered
by a man whom the judge threw out of the courtroom and physically abused); Spires
v. Bottorff, 317 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 938 (1964) (judge inter-
fered with judicial proceedings after he had disqualified himself); Wade v. Bethesda
Hosp., 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971) (judge ordered a person sterilized without
statutory authority).
1983]
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formed in his "judicial capacity."'51 The Supreme Court
stated that the relevant factors for determining whether an
act is a "judicial act" are: (1) the nature of the act itself, that
is, whether it is a function normally performed by a judge,
and (2) the expectations of the parties, in other words,
whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. 2
Since the above tests relate to the scope of judicial or quasi-
judicial immunity and the determination of whether particu-
lar acts or individuals warrant immunity, they should prove
helpful in determining whether to extend arbitral immunity
to the act (or "non-act") of failing to render a timely
decision.
III. THE Baar Opinion
In Baar v. Tigerman 53 a case of first impression, the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal held an arbitrator potentially liable
for failure to render a timely decision. The court based its
decision primarily on three grounds. First, the court recog-
nized that quasi-judicial immunity was necessary to promote
"fearless and independent decision making, ' 54 and to protect
arbitrators from "disgruntled litigants who [seek] to hold
[them] liable for alleged misconduct in arriving at a deci-
sion."'55 It then reasoned that because these policies serve
only to further the actual decision making process, they have
no applicability when the failure to render an award is the
conduct at issue. As a result, the court stated:
"[r]espondents' contention that this court should extend im-
munity to an arbitrator who never renders an award fails to
appreciate the nature of the arbitrator-party relationship and
misperceives the policy underlying arbitral immunity. "56
The court then cited E. C Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Construc-
51. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 360.
52. Id. at 362. For examples of "non-judicial acts" see Harris v. Harvey, 605
F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979) (judge undertook a racially motivated campaign to discredit
a black police officer); Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1978) (judge ordered a
coffee vendor handcuffed and brought before him merely because the vendor's coffee
tasted bad).
53. 140 Cal. App. 3d 979, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1983).
54. Id. at 982, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
55. Id. at 983, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 837 (emphasis omitted).
56. Id. (emphasis in original).
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tion Co. 57 to support its conclusion, but qualified its reliance
thereon.-8
The court further based its decision on what it perceived
to be the distinctions between judicial proceedings and arbi-
tration. 9 The court cited these differences in an attempt to
respond to Wyatt v. Arnot,60 which the defendants used to
support their claim for immunity. In Wyatt, the California
Court of Appeal extended judicial immunity to a judge who
failed to render a decision. After hearing a case the defend-
ant, Judge Amot, left the bench to assume a similar post in
another jurisdiction. The judge never decided the case and
the parties, forced to try the case before another judge,
sought to hold Judge Arnot liable for the additional costs
resulting from his failure to act.61 The court held that Judge
Arnot .could not be held liable for damages for his failure to
render a decision.62 The Baar court, however, distinguished
Wyatt, stating that "[b]ecause the judicial and arbitral roles
are so different in many fundamental respects, Wyatt is not
helpful to Tigerman in this case."' 63 To support this conclu-
sion the court listed "the many and significant differences
between judicial proceedings and arbitrations." 64
57. 551 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir.), reh ' denied in part, 559 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1067 (1978).
58. Baar, 140 Cal. App. 3d at 983 n.6, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 837 n.6. Ernst involved
an architect working on a construction project who also had the duty to "make writ-
ten decisions in regard to all claims . . . and to interpret the Contract Documents on
all questions arising in connection with the execution of the work." 551 F.2d at 1033
(quoting owner-contractor agreement). The subcontractor sought to hold the archi-
tect liable for delay in making several decisions regarding the acceptability of certain
building fixtures. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
arbitral immunity did not extend to delay or failure to render a decision because the
arbitrator lost his resemblance to a judge. Id. However, the court failed to ade-
quately define what role the architect was acting in, and his delay could be construed
as negligence in the performance of his duties as an architect.
59. Baar, 140 Cal. App. 3d at 984, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 837-38.
60. 7 Cal. App. 221, 94 P. 86 (1907).
61. Id. at., 94 P. at 87-88.
62. Id. at 94 P. at 89.
63. Baar, 140 Cal. App. 3d at 984, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
64. d. at 984, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 837. The court cited numerous differences, in-
cluding the constitutional power base of the judicial system, the need for an in-
dependent judiciary as "essential to the preservation of a democracy," the fact that
trials are public and arbitrations private, the precedential value of court decisions,
and the fact that arbitration cannot determine the rights and obligations of anyone
not a party to the contract and cannot decide any questions not presented by the
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The final portion of the court's decision focused on the
contractual nature of arbitration and the fact that Tigerman
had a contractual duty to render a timely award. The court
noted that "[a]rbitration is essentially a creature of con-
tract" 66 and that Tigerman's contractual obligations to the
parties had to be upheld. The court of appeal also recog-
nized that arbitration is a favorable alternative to litigation
and that an arbitrator must be protected when acting in a
quasi-judicial capacity. However, the court summarily dis-
missed these policies, giving greater weight to the policy
favoring arbitration as a speedy means of settling disputes
and the fact that a grant of immunity for failure to make an
award would run "directly counter" to this policy.67 The
court cited three cases from the 1800's to support its conclu-
sion that the contractual relationship between the parties
was the key to the resolution of the issue.68 As a result, the
California Court of Appeal held that "[r]emembering that
an arbitrator is not a judge and that arbitration is not a judi-
cial proceeding . . . a cause of action at the least was stated
in breach of contract . "...69
IV. CRITIQUE
In reaching its decision that Tigerman could be held re-
sponsible for failure to render a timely decision, the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal failed to adequately address the concept
of quasi-judicial immunity as it relates to arbitration. In ad-
dition, the court failed to give proper weight to the strong
policy arguments which mandate that arbitration is to be en-
couraged as an alternative to litigation. Further, the court
virtually ignored the possible implications that its relatively
landmark decision could have on the arbitration process in
parties - while a judge has a duty to decide all cases before the court and within its
jurisdiction. Id. at - 189 Cal. Rptr. at 837-38.
65. Baar, 140 Cal. App. 3d at 984-85, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
66. Id. (quoting Astoria Medical Group v. Health Ins. Plan, 11 N.Y.2d 128, 132,
182 N.E.2d 85, 87, 227 N.Y.S.2d 401, 403 (1962)).
67. Baar, 140 Cal. App. 3d at 984-85, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
68. Id. at 985, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 838-39 (citing Bever v. Brown, 56 Iowa 565, 9
N.W. 911 (1881); Hornet v. Godfrey, 3 Luzerne Leg. Reg. R. 10 (Pa. 1883); Boone v.
Reynolds, I Serg. & Rawle 231 (Pa. 1814)).
69. Baar, 140 Cal. App. 3d at 985, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
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general. As a result, the court's opinion is superficial and
one-sided.
In the first portion of its decision, the court noted that
quasi-judicial immunity historically extended to arbitrators
in order to promote "fearless and independent decision mak-
ing.",70 The court then reasoned that since there is no "prin-
cipled and independent" decision making involved in failing
to render an award, there is no need for quasi-judicial im-
munity.71 Although this is a valid distinction which must be
recognized, the decision to decline or grant arbitral immu-
nity to Tigerman should not have ended here. Regardless of
the seeming lack of "judgment-related" duties that rendering
a decision involves, the act of rendering a decision must it-
self be analyzed. The court of appeal did not determine
whether quasi-judicial immunity extended to the act (or
"non-act") 72 of failing to render a decision. Rather, the
court sidestepped the issue and compared only the failure to
render an award with misconduct in arriving at a decision.73
By analyzing the issue in this manner, the court was able to
come to the easy and seemingly logical conclusion that the
arbitrator should be held liable. Much more analysis, how-
ever, is required before such a novel issue can be resolved.
The court should have analyzed the act of rendering an
award under the Butz v. EconOmOU7 4 and Stump v. Spark-
man75 tests to determine whether it was a quasi-judicial act
entitled to the blanket of immunity.
70. Baar v. Tigerman, 140 Cal. App. 3d 979, 982, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834, 836 (1983).
71. Id. at 983, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
72. The distinction between the failure to render an award and the conduct in-
volved in reaching a decision can be equated with the distinction between misfea-
sance and nonfeasance. In early common law there was liability for misfeasance, or
"active misconduct," but not for nonfeasance, or "passive inaction." W. PROSSER,
LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 338-39 (4th ed. 1971). Although such a distinction would run
contrary to the result in the present case, under modem law liability commonly ex-
tends to situations where nonfeasance is involved. Id. As the court in Baar correctly
pointed out, nonfeasance liability has been extended to "anyone who, for a considera-
tion, has undertaken to perform a promise - or what we now call a contract," 140
Cal. App. 3d at 986 n.8, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 839 n.8 (quoting W. PROSSER, supra, § 56, at
339). The distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance, therefore, has no appli-
cation in this case.
73. Baar, 140 Cal. App. 3d at 983, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
74. 438 U.S. 478, 511 (1978). See supra text accompanying notes 44-48.
75. 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1974). See supra text accompanying notes 49-52.
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Following this reasoning, the "function comparability"
of the arbitrator's judgment concerning the timeliness of ren-
dering a decision should be compared with that of a judge
under similar circumstances. Simply stated, the arbitral act
of rendering a decision must be compared with the judicial
act of rendering a decision. It is tempting to respond to this
issue just as the court did, by stating that there is no judg-
ment involved in the act of rendering an award. However,
an examination of past case law indicates just the opposite,
namely that the act of rendering an award is indeed a judi-
cial act. The California Court of Appeal in Wyatt v. Arnot76
stated that "it is clear that the matter of the time when a
judge may decide a case submitted to him for decision is as
much a matter of judicial discretion and judgment as the
matter of how he may decide it."'77 Furthermore, in Jones v.
Brown,7 8 the Iowa Supreme Court stated that "[t]he arbitra-
tors, in determining the time and manner of making and
filing their award, acted in the same capacity that they did in
determining what their award should contain. '7 9 According
to this language, the judgment involved in the act of render-
ing an award is functionally comparable to a judge's and
therefore entitled to immunity.
However, the analysis must be carried further. The
Sparkman test8 ° must be applied to determine whether
Tigerman's failure to decide was, in fact, a "judicial act."8'
Under the Sparkman analysis, a two-pronged test must be
applied: first, the nature of the act itself must be examined
- here, whether the act of rendering an award is a function
normally performed by a judge; and, second, the expecta-
tions of the parties must be considered - in this case,
whether the parties dealt with the arbitrator in his arbitral
capacity. Under these two tests it becomes evident that the
act of rendering a decision is indeed a "judicial act." The act
76. 7 Cal. App. 221, 94 P. 86 (1907).
77. Id. at - 94 P. at 89-90.
78. 54 Iowa 747, 6 N.W. 140 (1880).
79. Id. at _ 6 N.W. at 142. The court further stated that "[a]s well might it be
claimed that a judge acts in a mere ministerial capacity in reducing an opinion to
writing, and thus hold him liable civilly upon the ground that such act was not judi-
cial." Id.
80. See supra text accompanying note 52.
81. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 362.
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of rendering an award is certainly a function normally per-
formed by a judge and, clearly, the parties dealt with
Tigerman in his arbitral (quasi-judicial) capacity. That an
arbitrator acts in a capacity similar to that of a judge is a
conclusion well supported by case law.82 As the Supreme
Court stated as early as 1855, "[a]rbitrators are judges cho-
sen by the parties to decide the matters submitted to them,
finally and without appeal. As a mode of settling disputes it
should receive every encouragement from courts of
equity."83
The court of appeal's superficial consideration of the act
of rendering a decision resulted in its erroneous treatment of
Wyatt v. Arnot.4 The court could have disposed of Wyatt as
bad law by reasoning that immunity extends only to protect
judgment-related functions, and that failure to render an
award involves no judgment whatsoever. Instead, the court
attempted to refute Wyatt by listing the "many and signifi-
cant differences between judicial proceedings and arbitra-
tions."8  By doing so the court severely weakened its
analysis.86 It should have attacked the Wyatt case head-on,
questioning its reasoning, the purposes behind immunity
and its application to such conduct. Instead, the court at-
tempted to distinguish the factually similar Wyatt case by
noting the differences between the judicial process and arbi-
tration. Thus, it committed the error of focusing on the loca-
82. See, e.g., Cahn v. International Ladies' Garment Union, 311 F.2d 113 (3d
Cir. 1962) (per curiam); Hill v. Aro Corp., 263 F. Supp. 324, 325 (N.D. Ohio 1967);
Hoosac Tunnel Dock & Elevator Co. v. O'Brien, 137 Mass. 424, 426 (1884).
83. Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344, 349 (1855).
84. 7 Cal. App. 221, 94 P. 86 (1907).
85. Baar, 140 Cal. App. 3d at 984, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 837. For a list of these
distinctions see supra note 64.
86. Even if the distinctions listed by the court were relevant to its treatment of
Wyatt, there are numerous similarities between arbitrations and judicial proceedings
which cannot be ignored. See, for example, Corey v. New York Stock Exch., 691
F.2d 1205, 1210 (6th Cir. 1982), in which the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
listed several of these similarities, including the fact that: arbitration is adversarial,
the parties have a right to be represented by counsel, discovery is available and hear-
ings are held at which arbitrators receive evidence and entertain arguments, the par-
ties have the opportunity to present witnesses and other evidence and to cross-
examine or impeach those of the adversary, and arbitrators issue written decisions
deciding the claim. See also Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 1282-1284.2 (West 1982) (statu-
tory provisions governing arbitrations, including power of subpoena, administration
of oaths and right to counsel).
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tion of the power involved. Under Butz v. Economou,8 such
a test is inappropriate. Immunity depends not on the source
or location of the decision making power, but rather on the
nature of that power.88 Therefore, the particular proceeding
from which the failure to render an award evolves, be it ar-
bitral or judicial, is irrelevant. The true focus should be on
the nature of the conduct: whether a quasi-judicial act or
function was performed. As a result, the Butz "functional
comparability" 89 test should be applied. Had the court ex-
amined the nature of the conduct rather than its location, it
would have found itself bound by Wyatt, since Wyatt also
involved the failure to render a decision.90 For this reason
the court should have questioned the logic applied in Wyatt,
rather than distinguish the forum in which the dispute was
decided.
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND ARBITRAL IMMUNITY
Even considering the above analysis, it can still be ar-
gued that the purposes and policies behind quasi-judicial
immunity just do not apply when failure to render a decision
is the conduct being challenged. That is, a strong argument
in favor of liability still exists, there being no real judgment
involved in the act of rendering an award. What cannot be
ignored, however, is the very strong national policy encour-
aging arbitration as an alternative to overcrowded court
dockets. 91
In the third portion of its opinion the court considered
this policy. By simply stating that "the courts have looked
87. 438 U.S. 478 (1978). See supra text accompanying note 48.
88. Butz, 438 U.S. at 512. See also Corey v. New York Stock Exch., 691 F.2d
1205, 1211 (6th Cir. 1982).
89. Butz, 438 U.S. at 512 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n.20
(1976)).
90. See supra text accompanying notes 60-62.
91. See, for example, Burger, supra note 2, at 275-77, which discusses the "explo-
sion" of litigation in recent years and strongly urging that arbitration be expanded
and used more frequently as an alternative to litigation. See also Corey v. New York
Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205, 1211 (6th Cir. 1982) ("[b]ecause federal policy encourages
arbitration and arbitrators are essential actors in furtherance of that policy, it is ap-
propriate that immunity be extended to arbitrators for acts within the scope of their
duties and within their jurisdiction"); Rhine v. Union Carbide Corp., 343 F.2d 12, 16
(6th Cir. 1965) ("[u]nder federal law it is now a clearly established national policy to
encourage the use of arbitration").
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favorably upon arbitration as an alternative to litigation in
the courts,' 92 the California Court of Appeal addressed the
entire issue regarding the public policy behind arbitration.
However, such a compelling policy should not be given such
superficial attention. Indeed, as recently as March 11, 1983,
the Sixth Circuit, in UAW v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 93 stated
that "[i]n light of the encouragement of arbitration and the
necessity for arbitrators to facilitate this policy, 'it follows
that the common law rule protecting arbitrators from suit
ought not only be affirmed, but f need be, expanded.' "94
The court also failed to adequately address the potential
"chilling effect" that a decision of liability could have on the
overall process of arbitration.9 5 The possibility of an arbitra-
tor being held liable for costs and attorney fees could make
it extremely difficult for organizations such as the AAA to
procure arbitrators. 96 Potential liability for costs and attor-
ney fees would place an unfair burden on the arbitrator, es-
pecially in complex commercial cases in which such
expenses can be astronomical, and especially since a large
number of commercial arbitrators volunteer their time and
receive no compensation. 97 This consideration was recog-
nized in Tamari v. Conrad,98 in which the Seventh Circuit
stated that "individuals . .. cannot be expected to volun-
teer to arbitrate disputes if they can be caught up in the
struggle between litigants and saddled with the burdens of
defending a lawsuit." 99 Furthermore, if an action based on
92. Baar v. Tigerman, 140 Cal. App. 3d 979, 984, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834, 838 (1983).
93. 701 F.2d 1181 (6th Cir. 1983).
94. Id. at 1186 (quoting Hill v. Aro Corp., 263 F. Supp. 324, 326 (N.D. Ohio
1967)) (emphasis added).
95. Petition of the AAA, supra note 7, at 6.
96. Id.
97. Id. See also G. GOLDBERG, supra note I, at 36. Commercial Arbitration
Rules § 51 provide:
Members [of the AAA] who serve as neutral arbitrators do so in most cases
without fee. In prolonged or in special cases the parties may agree to pay a fee,
or the AAA may determine that payment of a fee by the parties is appropriate
and may establish a reasonable amount, taking into account the extent of serv-
ice by the arbitrator and other relevant circumstances of the case.
Commercial Arbitration Rules § 51 (Am. Arb. Ass'n 1982), reprinted in G.
GOLDBERG, supra note 1, at 120.
98. 552 F.2d 778 (7th Cir. 1977).
99. Id. at 781. See also Domke, supra note 3, at 99.
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breach of contract for failure to render a timely award is al-
lowed, further erosion of the arbitration process could possi-
bly result.c0
Declining to extend immunity could also have an impact
on the quality of an arbitrator's decision because the arbitra-
tor may become concerned more with avoiding liability and
getting his award out on time than with the substantive qual-
ity of it. As the California Court of Appeal stated in Wyatt v.
Arnot,'0 1 "a judge has a right to give a case such considera-
tion as he feels may be necessary to reach a correct conclu-
sion, or at least a decision satisfactory to himself."' 0 2
Responding to this "quality of decision" argument, the court
of appeal in Baar v. Tigerman 103 correctly pointed out that
both the AAA and the California Legislature have estab-
lished time limits for rendering awards.1°4 However, impos-
ing liability on an arbitrator for untimely decision making
could also have an adverse impact on the granting of exten-
sions by the parties to the arbitration. Once a party knows
that it can recoup not only the arbitrator's fees, but also at-
torney fees and costs, it stands to reason that such a party
would be less likely to grant an extension. This is important,
especially in complex commercial cases in which extension is
often essential to resolution of the controversy. Finally, that
an arbitrator could be held potentially liable for costs and
attorney fees would necessarily result in every arbitrator
having to purchase costly malpractice insurance. Such a bur-
den would additionally discourage arbitrators from volun-
teering their services.
100. For example, in its petition to the California Supreme Court the AAA
stated:
[W]here does liability end? Assuming that after four years of arbitration
[Tigerman] had rendered an award against one of the Appellants, could not
that party have taken the position that four years of arbitration proceedings
and the resultant award did not amount to performance of some alleged cove-
nant on the part of the arbitrator and association to resolve the dispute in a
speedy fashion?
Petition of AAA, supra note 7, at 6.
101. 7 Cal. App. 221, 94 P. 86 (1907).
102. Id. at - 94 P. at 90.
103. 140 Cal. App. 3d 979, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1983).
104. Id. at 985, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 838. See also supra note 14.
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Although the court ignored virtually all of the policies
favoring arbitration and, therefore, a grant of immunity, it
did highlight one of the most crucial policies behind the sys-
tem of arbitration: because of its speed and certainty, arbi-
tration is a preferred means of settling disputes. 10 5
Consequently, the court of appeal correctly recognized that a
grant of immunity for failure to make an award would run
"directly counter to [this] policy" consideration.'0 6 The
court also properly recognized that arbitration is contractual
in nature and that the courts must uphold the contractual
obligations between parties.'0 7 Implicit in this statement is
the well-settled legal principle that compensatory damages
are generally recoverable for breach of a contractual obliga-
tion. 0 8 Therefore, an arbitrator who breaches his contract to
render an award within thirty days should be held liable for
the damages arising out of his breach.
The above considerations culminate in a direct conflict
between equally compelling policies: on one side exist poli-
cies favoring the speedy resolution of disputes through arbi-
tration and the high regard given to the contractual
relationship between the parties; and on the other side exist
policies strongly encouraging the use of the arbitration sys-
tem and the immunity of the individuals involved therein, as
well as the "chilling effect" that a denial of immunity could
have on the entire system.
VI. CONCLUSION
What evolves from a consideration of these competing
policies is the obvious need to avoid a result likely to have a
destructive impact on the individual parties to the dispute,
on the common law of contracts, and on the process of arbi-
tration. It is apparent, therefore, that a compromise must be
reached in which these opposing, but equally desirable, poli-
cies can achieve a state of equilibrium with each other.
105. See supra note 2. See also Poppleton, The Arbitrator's Role in Expediting the
Large and Complex Commercial Case, 36 ARB. J. 6 (1981).
106. Baar, 140 Cal. App. 3d at 985, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
107. Id.
108. See generally D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES §§ 12.1, .3
(1973).
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The solution to this problem is relatively simple and in-
volves both legal and equitable concepts. Equitably, it is ob-
vious that an arbitrator who has entered into a contract to
resolve a dispute should not be compensated if he or she
breaches that obligation and fails to render a decision. Fair-
ness and justice demand as much. In addition, the legal ob-
ligation to render a decision must be enforced. However, it
is equally obvious that an arbitrator should not be held lia-
ble for attorney fees and costs, which may no doubt add up
to quite an extraordinary sum, merely because an arbitrary
deadline'0 9 has not been met.110 This would be particularly
true in complex cases involving large amounts of evidence
and lengthy hearings. Holding an arbitrator potentially lia-
ble for such costs would place an undue amount of pressure
on the arbitrator, pressure that could affect the quality of his
or her decision. Therefore, the solution to this problem
would be to preclude the arbitrator from being compensated
for services that have not been rendered.
Withholding compensation from an arbitrator who fails
to make an award is supported by both case and statutory
law. In Graphic Arts International Union, Local 508 v. Stan-
dardRegister Co. ,"' the district court enjoined an arbitrator
from collecting any fee for services, due to the arbitrator's
failure to render an award. 2 In addition, the California
Constitution, which the Wyatt v. Arnot" 3 court relied upon
in its decision, provides that a judge may not receive his sal-
ary if any case before him remains pending and undeter-
109. The deadline is normally thirty days. See supra note 14.
110. Recognizing that in many commercial cases arbitrators volunteer their time
and receive no compensation for their services, the argument that an arbitrator should
not be held liable for damages is even stronger when the parties have not paid for the
arbitrator's services. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
111. 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2212 (S.D. Ohio 1979). It must be remembered, how-
ever, that the judgment and order of the district court were later set aside as being
beyond the matters presented to the court. See Graphic Arts Int'l Union, Local 508 v.
Standard Register Co., 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2214 (S.D. Ohio 1979). See also supra
note 41.
112. Standard Register, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2213. The court further stated
that "when two parties in a collective bargaining agreement have agreed to submit
their disputes to arbitration, there is implicit in that method of resolution a duty on
the part of the arbitrator to issue an award and bring the arbitration proceedings to a
conclusion." Id.
113. 7 Cal. App. 221, 228-29, 94 P. 86, 89 (1907).
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mined for ninety days after it has been submitted for
decision.' 1 4 Furthermore, in Bever v. Brown," 5 an action by
an arbitrator to recover his salary, the court allowed the par-
ties to assert as a defense the fact that the arbitrator's award
was valueless." 6
Thus, both by precluding an arbitrator from being com-
pensated for failing to perform a contractual obligation, and
by preventing him from being held liable for exorbitant fees
and costs, all policies are served and a collision between
them avoided. Disputes will still be settled in a "speedy and
certain" manner and the expanding field of arbitration will
not be imperiled. Arbitrators will be bound by their contrac-
tual obligations, but will not be subjected to the unreasona-
ble possibility of being faced with excessive damages. As a
result, all of the legal and equitable principles and policies
would remain at peace with each other in a desirable state of
equilibrium.
ALAN E. SENECZKO
114. Cal. Const. art. VI, § 19 provides: "A judge of a court of record may not
receive the salary for the judicial office held by the judge while any cause before the
judge remains pending and undetermined for 90 days after it has been submitted for
decision."
115. 56 Iowa 565, 9 N.W. 911 (1881).
116. Id. at ., 9 N.W. at 913. The court held "that the rule of judicial immunity
goes far enough when it protects the arbitrators from an action for damages, without
allowing them compensation for an act rendered useless by their willful misconduct."
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